Refuge for The Stranger: A Baumanian-Levinasian Review on Religion Amid Refugee Crisis

Kevin Nobel Kurniawan
Sekolah Tinggi Filsafat Driyarkara, Indonesia
University of Leeds, UK

Correspondence Author
Kevinnobel93@gmail.com

DOI
https://doi.org/10.33550/sd.v10i2.384

Abstract
This article discusses the relevance of the Baumanian-Levinasian notion of religion within a concrete analysis of refugee reception. As various classical approaches and definitions of religion have described it as a social phenomenon of grouping or an ideological tool for maintaining social order, it is necessary to provide a relevant approach to discussing religion as an ethical drive to build social inclusion through transmigration. The previous 2015 Western Europe immigration crisis due to the Syrian civil war has invited xenophobic responses towards immigrants, inevitably resulting in the socio-political impact of Brexit in 2020. Demonstrations of refugee resettlement driven by religious causes have provided a practical and ethical critique of secular liberalism. Furthermore, this article also reflects on the church's role as a refuge for refugees and marginalized groups in Indonesia. In conclusion, the Baumanian-Levinasian thought on religion and ethics remains relevant to both Western and Indonesian contexts in fostering inclusion, particularly during political turmoil.

Keywords: Levinas, Bauman, migration, refugee.
Introduction

This article discusses the notion of religion by the Bauman-Levinasian framework as ethical hospitality towards refugees. In the context of sociological and political tension, refugees are often viewed as unidentified and undesirable groups depicted as “The Other.”

The concrete application of the Baumanian-Levinasian ethical thought is demonstrated through the reception of refugees in the United Kingdom and Indonesian case studies. By providing a concrete application, the idea of refugee and the notion of hospitality can further clarify the position and role of religious communities, particularly that of Christian churches and communities.

Religion has often revolved around the issue of belief systems and has yet to be put into the existential and practical scope of social inclusion. As a discipline within the social sciences, sociology has often placed religion as a form of social grouping accompanied by ritual codes and practices. Various sociological thought sketches religion as a social community, characterized by the Durkheimian view of solidarity and as an ideological motivation posited by the Weberian view of value-driven social action. The classical depiction follows that religion is a social phenomenon with a complementary function.

However, this article would like to propose a novelty that “religion” can also be understood as an ethical and relational engagement towards civic and public life. Various writing on the Baumanian or Levinasian literature has often posited “a critical position” against modernity and the Western state as a legislative format drawn by the state to govern the society. Nevertheless, there are still minimum findings to describe and update the dynamic of its ethics in concrete application. In other words, “a restorative position” driven by the Bauman-Levinasian bargain of ethics is necessary to uncover its contribution to building a better society. By relying on the ethics of Levinas, this article engages the classical philosophical notion of religion. It brings into the concrete through a Baumanian sociological analysis to describe the problem of the refugee crisis. Sociologically speaking, Bauman described the term “The Stranger” as the humanitarian image of displaced individuals moving across state boundaries during the migration crisis.

By drawing on the previous refugee crisis in Western Europe, this article explores the engagement of religious communities towards the notion of cosmopolitanism and hospitality. Further evaluation of the Indonesian church is followed to describe religious communities as a refuge for refugees. Such philosophical-sociological ethics are demonstrated beyond the case of interstate migration but also towards churches as hospitable communities during periods of intrastate tensions. The research question in this study

---

6 Amos Sukamto, Herlina N., Sofianto K., and Soleiman Y. “Impacts of the Religious Policies Enacted from 1965 to 1980 on Christianity in...
is formulated as follows: “How does the Baumanian-Levinasian review of religion as ethics for hospitality remain relevant in the refugee crisis or political turmoil?” This article attempts to show that religious ethics can be a refuge for marginalized individuals or social groups in concrete situations.

Research Methods

This study applies a systematic literature review as its methodology. Systematic literature review is an academic method to identify and map relevant literature to conclude a research question.\(^7\) In this study, the author provides a general scheme on the theme of religion as described in the classical sociological theory. As described in the Durkheimian, Weberian, and Marxist traditions, classical sociological theory describes “religion” as a social phenomenon. Afterward, the author took another step to elevate “religion” as an ethical notion of hospitality as described by the Levinasian philosophy and Baumanian sociological inquiry. By doing so, the idea of “religion” is later reinterpreted as a social phenomenon and an existential and primordial ethical energy that engages in a particular social setting, debunking the limits of societal values.

This article also applies a comparative case study to analyze Western and non-Western contexts. This approach uses two logic of comparison: “tracing across” sites or scales.\(^8\) The primary social setting which is being discussed is the global migration crisis in the United Kingdom. The author posits the Baumanian-Levinasian position to criticize the limits of secular liberalism in engaging the migration of refugees. The secondary social setting is the Indonesian church during the communist upheaval in New Order Indonesia. The author argues that the relevance of Baumanian-Levinasian ethics extends from the Western Eurocentric context of displaced migrants into Indonesian society to political minority groups.

Literature Review

The Durkheimian and Weberian Views on Religion

Let us first begin by understanding the basic description of religion. The first facet of “religion” is anchored in its definition as a social group. This type of argument follows the Durkheimian view, which depicts religion as a unifying force to maintain social solidarity and prevent anomie (social disintegration). In this case, religion, which contains the gravity of social solidarity, becomes the primary example to explain how individuals are bonded into particular groups, revolves around it by abstract belief systems and practical rites. When one person revolves around the meaning of religion, one belongs to a specific “gravitational centre” of the meaningful belief system; he or she would be able to enjoy a certain degree of “belongingness”. Thus, religion’s function is to provide the shelter of communality, preventing the individual from losing touch with social unification and

---

falling into loneliness or suicide.\(^9\)

Durkheim adds that elevating “religion” as a sacred idea from mundane everyday activities serves as a social fact, standard of morality, and unifying force. Religion is not only a system of obligation but also draws the individuals’ attention to “desire it”, that a moral act would be measured by the individual readiness and willingness to dedicate, or even sacrifice themselves for, the existence of the group. The ascetic act of self-sacrifice to protect certain religious beliefs is considered the supreme act of morality as it somehow maintains the social life span of the group.\(^{10}\)

The qualification ‘moral’ has never been given to an act which has individual interests, or the perfection of the individual from a purely egotistic point of view… Morality begins with membership of a group, whatever that group may be. When this premise is accepted the characteristics of the moral fact become explicable… society, while being good, constitutes a moral authority which, by manifesting itself in certain precepts particularly important to it, confers upon them an obligatory character.\(^{11}\)

The Durkheimian notion of solidarity is anchored in the argument that protecting a religious group is only possible within the internal boundary of an imagined social or political community.\(^{12}\) If a religious group, like any other social group, is to be maintained, operating within a “friend or foe scenario” is necessary. One should not commit to any outgroup community but only the ingroup community. Social exclusion is the necessary formula or mandatory path to protect the existence of an ingroup.\(^{13}\) The Durkheimian logic is incapable of engaging religion for the broader cosmopolitan perspective. Ethics is only relevant for the same members of ingroup communities, and it is unethical to help non-members from the outgroup.

In The Protestant Ethic, Weber argues that religion provides the ideological basis to promote modern capitalism. It inspires the voluntary act of the individual to participate in ascetic labour, supporting the legal-rational bureaucratic society. In this sense, religion serves as the utilitarian means by which the nation-state progresses through the linear rationalization process in modern society.\(^{14}\) The ethical notion of religion is posited to promote the process of state-crafting, which is related to the logic of utilitarianism.

the development of the spirit of capitalism is best understood as part of the development of rationalism as a whole, and could be deduced from the fundamental position of rationalism on the basic problems of life. In the process Protestantism would only have to be considered in

---

11 “It should be noted that the notion of “morality” as stated by Durkheim is not equivalent to ethical-religious morality as understood by the Judeo-Christian ethic of “loving one’s neighbour”. The motivation for sociological forms of morality, as Durkheim posited, is a social fact. It is an independent form of social energy outside the individuals that unites them as a whole; it is a sui generis. Therefore, one can assume that the Durkheimian morality is synonymous to communality. Certainly, such forms of morality will express itself in religious norms. However, in sociological analysis, religious norms are closely related to religiosity as compared to religious ethics.” Emile Durkheim, *Sociology and Philosophy* (London: Routledge, 2010), 17.
so far as it had formed a stage prior to the development of a purely rationalistic philosophy.\\textsuperscript{15}

As far as this argument is being clarified, we can understand that religion is nothing more than an ideological motor of modernization. Religion is symbolic and functional but still lacks an authentic, ethical role toward fellow men. Weber actively maintains that the role of religion might somehow lubricate the crude logic of bureaucracy and capitalism and “re-enchants” modern society with religious moralism.\\textsuperscript{16} However, religion, in this sense, is posited only as a psychological motivation compressed within the framework of modern rationalism. The Weberian “religion” has yet to propose moral humanism.

Both classical sociological views religion as a product of society, not a moral inspiration. In the sociological dimension, religion is often criticized for lacking an ethical role as it is reduced to a social or ideological function within the scope of institutions. To elevate the role of religion to serve the human good, one cannot view religion within the analytical radar of sociology. Religion requires the dimension of ethical angst in understanding the meaning of manhood. Such a notion can only be described through metaphors of “otherness” as the human image of personhood.\\textsuperscript{17}

A Marxist (Self-)Critic of Religion and Liberalism

The Marxist sociological perspective is quite pessimistic in viewing religion. Durkheim supports religion as a unifying energy. Weber describes religion as a cultural and economic force. Both argue that religion has its function in society. However, according to Marx, religion’s “unifying, cultural, economic” function prohibits social change and the emancipation of social resources in a capitalistic society. In his famous dictation, Marx recalls religion as an “opium,” producing false consciousness in society.

The Marxist or Communist manifesto hinges on the core value of social justice in its materialistic forms. For Marx, religion should be abolished just as capitalism and its various ideological accessories should be denied. As the base economic structure of materialism is the root of the societal phenomenon, Marx would argue that the disenchantment of religious matters is crucial to provide a necessary solution to any, if not all, social problems. Religion is the supra-structure that functions as “upper sediments”, sweeping the real material economic issue “under the carpet”.

Religious suffering is, at one and the same time, the expression of real suffering and a protest against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people.\\textsuperscript{18}

\\textsuperscript{15}While the Durkheimian view of religion tends to posit it as a unifying force for the collective society, the Weberian view tends to view religion as a cultural and psychological drive for individual motivation and action. In this way, religion such as Protestantism may create utilitarian and rational motives of economic actions, but its spirit of capitalism is nonetheless similar to secular ideological forces. Once the goal of economic development has been reached, the ethic of Protestant capitalism could be disposed as such any ideology can be cancelled,” Weber, The Protestant Ethic, 37.


\\textsuperscript{18}“This famous quotation from Marx originated from his article which later is put into the book, Das Capital. Similar to Nietzsche’s argument on religion as a form of denial towards the real existential situation, Marx argues that religion acts as a diversion towards material suffering of the oppressed class. By maintaining religion, the proletariat is made unconscious to see the actual economic problem. They retain themselves in passivity...
Concerning refugee resettlement, religion or hospitality is nothing more than an echo of economic pity. The act of charity and its religious conviction that “all men are made equal” are only the tip of the situation in which the state-capitalist class is above the proletarian-refugee class. Religious organizations and communities responsible for providing help in refugee resettlement serve as a “buffer” and continue to support and maintain the existing class hierarchies in society. Emancipation would better be done without religion in the very first place. In short, charity towards the poor confines them in continual poverty and results not in any social change despite its ethical ingredient.  

The ethos of the communist manifesto removes the transcendence of God as its ethical inspiration and consecrates the communal proletariat state above individual rights. The state is its prime end, and any deed is considered ethical if it is for the good of the state and on behalf of “the people”. The people are none other than the proletariat population who represents the face of the state and its ideology. While “The Other” demands the ethical loss of power, communism and its socialist ethics do not act based on losing power but on gaining power by taking it from the upper class. Thus, there is minimum moral room for ethical demand in communism; the state instead fills in with political demand. The spirit of the communist manifesto is both an antithesis and a derivation of religious ethics, a substitution of the transcendence with the proletariat revolutionary anthem for power.

Results

The Moral Crisis of Secular Humanism: on Liberalism and Utilitarianism

In the current period, the transition from modernity towards late modernity reveals that nationalism has evolved to globalization, and citizenship rights within each nation-state have experienced metamorphosis to worldwide cosmopolitanism. As mass human mobilization is reaching Europe because of international interference and failed states, major liberal European countries are increasingly becoming more reluctant to support the same human rights values they endorse towards non-Western nation-states.

The cosmopolitan prophecy that every state would participate in accommodating proportional global responsibility was proven unfulfilled. On the contrary, xenophobic sentiments towards refugees have increased, and anti-immigration policies have been implemented. They are both encouraged by local citizens and state apparatus to keep “the chaos outside the border”. Democracy, often a beacon of Western civilization, has reached its peak of the pendulum and is now back-lashed into the opposite pole of anti-globalism.


and ultra-nationalism. Tariq Modood argues how secular liberalism struggles to engage toward a Cosmopolitan society despite having the central role in propagating human rights. As we return to the religious ethic of Levinas, one should be able to observe that multiculturalism is, unfortunately, a cultural extension of utilitarianism. The birth of multiculturalism occurred when Britain invited colonial immigrants to enhance the hosting state for economic progressivism. The policy of the White National Act in the 1970s presupposes that immigration requires a reciprocal relation whereby the state provides a “multicultural and Rawlsian recognition” to minority rights if new immigrants can promise to provide what the state intended: cultural assimilation and economic labour force. Thus, the reception of immigrants or “The Other” has not been a genuine act of moral engagement, even if it is presented under “multiculturalism” when it is a multicultural classification of human migrants and citizens.

Alasdair Macintyre, as described by Bretherton, demonstrated that even secular liberalism was a form of domination by Western tradition. It has taken the form of ideological and social norms that “classify” differing religious groups and cannot provide an adequate voice to uplift the notion of selfing without othering. Secular liberalism, in this sense, is still bound to a particular form of Durkheimian solidarity, which shows a certain reluctance in accepting the existence of alterity, in this case, the refugees. As the ideology of secular liberalism is still embedded in state-centric boundaries and cultural sentimentality, it is difficult for the secular state to provide room for refugees, which, to some extent, embodies the imagery of ambivalence, threat, and terrorism.

Xenophobic sentiments against anti-immigration reveal that secular liberalism cannot provide rights and liberty to a particular human outgroup. It is, perhaps, the incapacity of secular legalism to rise above its mechanistic regulation to climb towards a moral view of state sovereignty. Ideally, states are given sovereignty to recognize refugee rights before exerting their legal policies to accept or deny their presence within the political boundary. The political interpretation of human immigration, if reduced without a moral sense, could fall to the Weberian crude utilitarian rationality of exerting bureaucratic border control to keep “chaos out from the society”. Ironically, the state continuously produced humanitarian discourse by pointing out that “there are already charitable institutions which are assisting the refugees” - without taking the obligatory role in hospitality towards displaced groups.

Racial and religious sentiments have also followed the emergence of secular liberalism. Although religious sentiments should have led to de-secularisation, the notion of British populism, “Englishness and Anglicanism”, is bonding an ideological alliance with the secular utilitarian and Hobbesian form of state sovereignty.\(^{30}\) The rejection of refugees and religious ethics by certain ultra-conservative groups is guided by implicit and explicit voices of White Supremacy as a fixed anchoring group identity in the postmodern quantum of uncertainty.\(^{31}\)

**A Baumanian-Levinasian Philosophical Review of Religion as Ethical Engagement**

The contemporary role of religion after modernity and the Holocaust attempts to engage in a philosophical and sociological voice in challenging the utilitarian approach of secular liberalism. The notion that morality precedes ontology derives from the Biblical narrative that “human being is created in the image of God”, that to see “The Face” is to observe that alterity leads to transcendence; the encounter with “the Other” suggests the sacredness of the “Bare life” which exists on the life of another personal image of a human being.

In each human being as an image of God, as if the impression or trace of God is the face of the other. The idea is indispensable to Levinas’s account of ethics. In his view it is not enough to have an abstract moral conception of persons, as Kantian and utilitarian morality suppose, because ethical responsiveness must attend to the uniqueness of the other.\(^{32}\)

The personal responsibility of man with regard to man is such that God cannot annul it. This is why, in the dialogue between God and Cain - ‘Am I my brother’s keeper?’ - rabbinical commentary does not regard the question as a case of simple insolence. Instead, it comes from someone who has not yet experienced human solidarity and who thinks (like many modern philosophers) that each exists for oneself and that everything is permitted.\(^{33}\)

In contrast to the classical sociological view, the role of religion in contemporary social life can be recalled from the Levinasian formulation of religion as the ethical responsibility towards “The Stranger”. Levinas and Bauman recalled the ethical-religious question, “Am I my Brother’s Keeper?” as its primary root for moral engagement. This question symbolizes the “murder of morality” whereby the self proclaims itself independent from “the other”.\(^{34}\) The centralization of the individual self from The Other somehow presents the Western worldview of the ontological self, superseding the sacred morality. Bauman later continues to argue that the existence of the Holocaust is none other than the product of Western modernity. In some ways, it presents the enhancement of individual ontology.

\(^{30}\) Adrian Favell, *Philosophies of Integration* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 137.


while sacrificing human morality.\(^{35}\)

This view of religion is considerably significant to critic Western thoughts. Western philosophy is rooted in its Eurocentric view of reality, which posits the Western hemisphere in a superior judgment towards non-Western culture and continues its totalizing systematization of social reality. According to Levinas, the Heideggerian approach to social reality focuses on the Being that is the “Western self”, not “The Other”. It is described in the following: “I can feed on these realities and to a great extent satisfy myself, as though I had simply been lacking them. Their alterity is thereby reabsorbed into my own identity as a thinker or a possessor.”\(^{36}\) The existence of the second moral party, The Other, is a form of utility to which it serves the ontological existence of the egoistic self; such form of ethics is only an amoral systematizing perspective to “intake” The Other as part of its own.\(^{37}\)

Levinas stressed that the presence of The Other is “reverse-intentional,” which is unintentional and unprepared within the perspective of The Self.\(^{38}\) The challenge provided by the presence of the non-self might appear to be a threat (anti-self) to the hospitality demand. Hospitality, after all, is an avoidable offence for the individual self, which distracts its narcissistic tendency for self-actualization. Levinas seems to argue that the path to transcendence is through the hospitality of The Other. One who values the authentic self will primarily value the presence of other selves, and whoever rejects the notion of transcendence could only succumb and maintain the ontological self.

The Judeo-Ethic, expressed in the Levinasian philosophy of “being for the other”, continues to resound in Bauman’s sociological writing. Bauman refers closely to Levinas and Logstrup’s Ethical Demand (a Danish Lutheran theologian and philosopher) to construct his view on morality.\(^{39}\) “Postmodern” refers to “another way of viewing ethics” after the onslaught of modernity and its Holocaust. The tragic history of the Holocaust demands a fundamental revision of ontology and morality. This history leads Bauman to reinterpret “The Levinasian Face” as the “Sacredness” of human individuality.

The face of a neighbor signifies for me an unexceptionable responsibility, preceding every free consent, every pact, every contract. It escapes representation; it is the very collapse of phenomenality. Not because it is too brutal to appear, but because in a sense too weak, non-phenomenon because less than a phenomenon. The disclosing of a face is nudity, non-form, abandon of self, ageing, dying, more naked than nudity.\(^{40}\)

Bauman argued that modernity is moving towards the Weberian “iron cage” with its obsession with pure rationality. The classification process, utilization, and totalization have subsequently offended and abused the “bare life” of The Face by categorizing the human


\(^{40}\) Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence. (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1998), 88.
person - whether one is fit for citizenship or deportation, assimilation, or rejection. The process of objectification is similar to imputing personas (masks) upon “The Face” to behave as “actors in drama within the script” of a superior political community. The encounter with “The Other” or “The Face” suggests the state of total alterity as every human face is never entirely similar to another, and each individual is to be recognized and dignified. Thus, ethics cannot be formulated into a general scheme applied to all the general, but it is concrete and particular within every “face” of the individual human being.

Discussion

Limits of the Baumanian-Levinasian Ethics

Questions will arise to challenge on what basis is one obligated to protect “The Other” without any possibility to reject it? The form of such martyrdom is nevertheless without ground. It might even fall to the description “Fetishism of the Other”. Suppose an unconditional form of hospitality might be interpreted as an obsession of the outgroup, knowing that the moral indebtedness towards “The Other” is considerably an “absurd” idea to the secular liberal mind. How does one accept that the moral responsibility towards “The Other” is indeed necessary when it contradicts the fulfillment of one’s ontological well-being?

Within the territory of secularism, a matrix of neutral amoralism, one should understand that it is a religious ethic that is the ground root for humanitarian ethics. The Levinasian philosophical ethics, which Bauman positively supported, challenged the utilitarian approach of secular liberalism. The notion that morality precedes ontology derives from the theological concept that the “human being is created in the image of God”. To see “The Face” is to observe that alterity leads to transcendence. The encounter with “the Other” suggests the unconditional sacredness of the “Bare life,” which exists in the life of another personal human entity. Thus, the offence towards such a form of “sacredness” is particularly apparent within the framework of utilitarian act. Such ethics is a non-computable form of social energy within the system of utilitarianism. The basis that religion provides, in this context, is the “re-consecration” of the human individual that should not be bound within the banal logic of utilitarianism or secular liberalism.

Second, secular liberalism alone is still inadequate to provide justifiable ground for a moral and ethical motivation toward civic engagement. Although liberalism has taken its root in the Judeo-Christian ethic, Rawlsian liberalism seems to suggest that every individual is ontologically “a customer” deserving certain social and political rights but lacks

the emphasis on individual responsibility. The teleological emphasis, perhaps, falls on the individual’s “rights” while abandoning the “responsibility” that the Judeo-Christian tradition often argued. Considering that the secular liberalism of Rawl is true, the political means to fulfill individual rights could be most effectively operated through the Weberian description of the bureaucratic and utilitarian approach in a calculative and fair utilitarian manner. The emphasis, perhaps, falls on the “rights” of the individual instead of the “human individuality” which the Judeo-Christian tradition affirmed.

However, the fulfillment of liberal rights may not conclude that it is moral. Instead, it contains the notion of reciprocity and mutual symbiosis between citizens and state. Without the element of “Sacred” or “The Face”, it will fall to the amoral rationalism, which does not account for morality sensitivity but adheres closely to the pragmatic solution to provide and distribute resources. Considering that secular liberalism provides rights to only the solidarity of ingroup citizenship, the same hospitable rights may not always be distributed in an obligatory manner to outgroup immigrants, refugees, and other forms of alternative groups; moral sovereignty for the state to recognize prior rights of any migrants may not be possible in such a crude paradigm of governmentality.

Religious Communities in the European Refugee Crisis

The provision of hospitality in the current refugee resettlement represents an opposition against xenophobic sentiments and the utilitarian mechanism within state immigration policies. The moral vacuum that secular liberalism has left empty is filled by religious proactiveness. The role of minority religious communities in the United Kingdom appears within civic participation, persuading state policies, acting as intermediaries in assisting refugee resettlement. Although some secular communities engage in the hospitable project, the discourse of “sacredness” and human rights are further reinforced. This view of religion challenges the secular and religious sentiments of viewing border control as an amoral political and populist movement. Thus, it describes how state policies are directed by power struggles while providing no clear indication of humanitarian motivation.

By resorting back to tradition, Macintyre argues that the logic of hospitality can transcend the mechanism of amoral governmentality. The entrance of moral understanding that one is obliged to be responsible and hospitable to the cosmopolitan community shows that morality is not only confined within the limited boundary of a political nation-state as described in the Durkheimian view. In terms of the Weberian notion, the role of religious somehow prevents the full accomplishment of a legal-rational state from transiting

---

towards a complete “iron cage” of bureaucratic modernization. Religious ethics suggests rationalization should not have wholly dissolved “humanity” in an iron cage. “The Other” is not driven by governmental control, presenting that ethical agency is also made possible by the causality of social processes.

By referring to the book written by Johnstone & Merrill, Serving God in Migrant’s Crisis, a practical account of religious involvement in refugee service, this article attempts to further clarify the various practical methods to “Bringing Baumanian-Levinasian ethics into practice” within the scope of the religious communities. Religious communities participate in civil services based on informal associations. The return of community-based networks and informal ties complement the state regulatory mechanism. The responses of grassroots communities are quicker and more flexible in providing hospitable services. Asylum seekers and refugees find receiving assistance from informal ties more convincing. The involvement of religious communities served as “a communal lubricant” to smoothen the process of resettlement and moderation for the anti-xenophobic sentiments produced by both the secular and ultra-religious grounds.52

The communal relation that began among intra-religious groups gave the sense of “togetherness,” an essential element in motivating a moral approach to the public and non-citizen individuals. In attending to refugees, they can provide social and emotional support. Religious communities can provide a linguistic connection whereby refugees can speak out their trauma regarding their religious vocabulary, thus supplying non-material and psychological needs. While not all religious communities may not share an exact similarity with those particular refugees, the similarity in the belief in transcendental God and humanity allows interreligious communal sense.53

The involvement of Christian religious communities has also assisted in national and intergroup integration. Indeed, there are various elements to which refugees need to be assimilated into the wider host community, such as legal, linguistic, and economic aspects.54 As refugee resettlement agencies, secular or religious, may sometimes only depend on sponsors and voluntary participation, economic donation alone may be insufficient to sustain the various dimensions operating the process of resettlement and integration. Christian religious communities’ participation in fulfilling professional positions, providing language training and legal and economic support have smoothed the integration of refugees into the wider social community.55

When refugee resettlement agencies cannot continue hospitalizing refugees, state funding may ignore such organizations. It is as if such agencies are vulnerable and often put into the confinement of amoral governmentality, border, and immigration control, which frequently overshadow the ethical role committed by charitable organizations. Thus,

---

52 Patrick Johnstone and Dean Merrill, Serving God in a Migrant Crisis (Downer Groves: InterVarsity Press, 2018), 75.
even the most ethical organizations, such as refugee resettlement agencies or the state, might get “lost within the surveillance of amoral governmental control”. Since disenchantment continues within the Euro-Western society, societal life is reduced to the basic bureaucratic and crude utilitarian approach. Without moral sensitivity, the pragmatic solution to provide and distribute resources to “the useful” will be applied, omitting the ethical hospitality to outgroup immigrants, refugees, and other forms of alterity.

Relevance of Baumanian-Levinasian Framework in the Indonesian Context

The Baumanian-Levinasian approach to “the stranger” is relevant to other social contexts. As Judeo-Christian ethics is centred on the transcendence of man-to-man relations, its universal value is perhaps relevant to other areas of analysis, whether from a geographical or socio-historical location. In this case, I find that the religious-ethical framework can analyze the Indonesian religious communities, such as the churches, which acted as refuge during political turmoil.

During the colonial period, the Christian religion was often viewed as the colonizers’ bourgeois religion by the indigenous people. The slogan of “Gold, Glory, Gospel” combines both religious and economic-political interests of Western colonial powers. Christianity is viewed as none other than the oppressor’s religion through the local eyes. The Dutch colonial powers did not intend to consider spreading the gospel but tended to confine the church as a “refuge” for the Westerners living in the Indonesian archipelago.

It was not until the New Order period that the Indonesian Christian religious minorities, both Catholic and Protestant, turned churches into refuges. From 1965 to the 1980s, the failed Communist coup d’etat was retaliated by the Indonesian military, which in turn became the New Order government. Various religious groups have collaborated and been pressured by the military to search and persecute members of the Indonesian communist party members. Most victims were nominal abangan Muslims who “immigrated away” from their former religion due to intense political sentimentality at that period.

While Catholic and Protestant churches oppose communism and adhere to the Indonesian Pancasila, the church remains a safe ground for “refugees” targeted for their affiliation with political identity. The significant church growth in Indonesia is not only a national phenomenon, but it is also considered to be a growth of Christianity on a global scale. Until today, the church has become a safe space whereby both perpetrators and victims can meet and build reconciliation over the past traumas during the crisis of the Indonesian genocide.

The increasing number of “Muslim to Christian converts” during the New Order certainly has not been met with a friendly response. First of all, as “PKI” (Partai Komunis Indonesia) or Indonesian Communist Party members migrated and took refuge within the church, Christianity is seen to be the protector of the enemy of the state. This condition is quite similar to the Baumanian description of the Nazi regime that attacks not only the Jews who were deemed as “enemies of the state” but also churches or other Christian groups who demonstrated a “positive” or “neutral” stance towards them.\(^{61}\) Second, there are negative responses from Indonesian Islamic groups due to the increasing number of Christian converts.\(^{62}\) As churches become a refuge for “Christianisation”, they may escape the label of being recipients of “ex-communist members,” but they are posited as “opportunistic proselytizers” during socio-political turmoil. Thus, anxiety towards Christian religious minorities in the Reformation Order is not without a cause. The current vandalism and restriction of church plantings are the unintended consequences of the church acting as “the Good Samaritan”.

The Current Situation of Afghanistan Refugees in Indonesia

There are currently a rising number of Afghanistan refugees in Indonesia. After the withdrawal of United States forces from Afghanistan, the Taliban group has taken over the capital city without much resistance. Many Afghanistan refugees who have been displaced are currently applying for asylum in various states.\(^{63}\) Afghanistan refugees have reached the shores of the Indonesian archipelago. Currently, there are 7458 Afghan refugees in Indonesia by September 2021. Based on the United Nations Refugee Agency report, the refugees have various educational and economic needs. One thousand seven hundred school-aged children are not attending formal schools. One thousand seven hundred fifty-three refugees are enrolled in online education platforms. One thousand one hundred fifty-five vulnerable refugees from 433 households receive monthly subsistence allowance.\(^{64}\)

This is what the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees asked of us when he pleaded that we work to create “space in the hearts and minds” of our people for refugees and asylum seekers. He was admitting that the UN cannot do this from on high. It must rather be addressed by voices already known, trusted, and respected. Spiritual leaders will get far more acceptance than politicians on the topic of welcoming migrants.\(^{65}\)

While more than 50% of the refugees in Indonesia are from Afghanistan, we must be informed that the target of their destination is Australia. Australia is a country that has been ratified into the 1951 Geneva Convention on refugees, while Indonesia is not. However, Australia’s stricter immigration policies have caused Afghanistan refugees to

---

65 Johnstone and Merrill, Serving God in a Migrant Crisis, 125-126.
reside in Indonesia without legal status or guarantee for permanent resettlement. As the Indonesian government has not been confirmed to assist refugees, children and adolescents cannot attain their educational needs from the state. Adults are not able to work and provide their household with necessities. Gender-based violence, lack of child protection, and psychological, legal, and socio-cultural protection are still insufficient.66

These findings show several similarities in opportunities between the Indonesian and the United Kingdom cases. The governments in both countries cannot directly fulfil the refugees’ necessities. The government in the United Kingdom has ratified the 1951 Geneva Convention. However, it imposes strict immigration policies to protect its sovereignty and its “British identity” - a similar case as in the Australian’s. On the other hand, the Indonesian government cannot implement a refugee resettlement program due to its international status as unratified in the 1951 Geneva Convention. However, Indonesian society’s multicultural society and Muslim-majority status tend to attract and appeal to a more friendly attitude toward Afghanistan refugees.

Civil societies and voluntary organizations such as the church could become a “refugee for refugees” once again.67 The church must remember and retain its ethical stance of becoming a Brother’s Keeper, whatever religion or citizenship status they have. The Baumanian-Levinasian ethical appeal or its Judeo-Christian ethic remains relevant. In times of crisis, hospitality is an ethical demand that should be considered. While the crisis is not as severe as the World War, the Nazi regime, or the Indonesian genocide, the weight of refugees’ subjective experiences is still essential. The matter of “refugees at our doors” is not burdened on the “refugees”, but more on “our doors” - whether we are willing to open it.68

Conclusion

This article attempts to demonstrate the relevance of the Baumanian-Levinasian view of religious ethics in the concrete hospitality of refugee reception. Based on this research, the Baumanian-Levinasian ethics transcends the classical sociological view of religion as a social grouping and exerts the primordial origin of morality in its humane form. In other words, the Baumanian-Levinasian framework suggests that morality is not confined to a specific societal structure or context. However, it transcends and criticizes the limits of legislated morality made by societal apparatus. For example, the limits of Western morality or secular liberalism is its dependence on utilitarian roots. The Western understanding of “humanity” is designated in its notion of “usefulness”, particularly in economic settings. Thus, locating “refugees” in the fabric of societal inclusion is insufficient.

In the United Kingdom case, one can take this opportunity to open its door of hospitality for refugees. The “Western humanism” tends to extend to the Western domestic population. The concept of the Heideggerian ontological self remains strong, and the Durkheimian drives it need to maintain the ingroup. Thus, the image of a refugee is often omitted or regarded as an undesirable outgroup for the state. While the state is countering the inflow of migrants, the Levinasian hospitality is extended to the stranger through religious communities, some of which are the Christian refugee resettlement agencies.

The Baumanian-Levinasian framework could also be extended to other societal contexts. In the Indonesian case, the image of “refugee” is not confined to the presence of migrants or displaced individuals such as those in the European context. However, as described by Geertz, it could be spotted in the “political enemy” categories or sub-religious categories such as abangan Muslims. Indeed, there are refugees or displaced migrants from Afghanistan and Rohingya residing in Indonesia whose basic educational or occupational needs have not been fully met.

In the Indonesian context, it is found that the state has not been well-equipped with refugee reception policies. The 1951 Geneva Convention does not apply to the Indonesian state policies. Therefore, the alternative to providing aid to refugees is through non-governmental organisations such as the church. The church can actively provide legal assistance for refugees’ resettlement status, educational aid in literacy, numeracy, and cultural tutorship, economic needs such as part-time informal jobs, and acting as intermediaries in the socio-cultural integration of Afghanistan refugees into Indonesian society.

While the Baumanian-Levinasian framework has often been interpreted as a “critic” or an opposing voice against the insufficiency of state and societal moral norms, this article demonstrates that it can be applied in concrete situations with a “restorative” approach. Discovering a hospitable form of moral engagement towards refugees is not thoroughly impossible. The primordial moral sensitivity to receiving differing images of “stranger” is vital to hospitality and engagement in the fabric of state and societal construct of moralism. This consciousness of ethical-religious engagement makes a practical approach toward religious-psychological needs and economic, linguistic, and legal assistance possible.

References


Damayanti, Angel, and Sri Yunnan. “From Evangelization to Worship: The Changing


